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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the capital flow experience of transition economies who are also 
prospective EU members with a view to shedding light on the likely problems they might 
encounter with exchange rate policy in the run up to euro area membership. We show that 
they have been experiencing fairly sizeable capital flows since the early 1990s. We explain 
these flows using two separate models. The first explains the level of capital flows using 
panel data from the prospective EU members. The second concentrates specifically on 
estimating the probability of a country experiencing downward speculative pressure. In both 
cases, the contribution of domestic factors and contagion is explored. The results suggest that 
while domestic factors have some role to play, it is rather limited. Moreover there is clear 
evidence of contagion effects, suggesting that macroeconomic policy in the prospective EU 
members will be complicated by capital flows in the run up to euro area membership. 
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A key issue facing transition economies who are prospective EU members is what 
exchange rate policy they should pursue in the period between EU and euro area entry. It is 
anticipated that ERM II membership, which involves a commitment to a pegged exchange 
rate, will be necessary for a period of at least two years in line with the Maastricht Treaty and 
the obligations fulfilled by current euro area members
1. An important factor determining the 
ease with which this commitment will be met is the extent to which the transition economies 
experience large and variable capital flows along with the determinants of these flows.  
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this issue by examining the capital-
flow experience of the prospective EU members. We show that they have been experiencing 
fairly sizeable capital flows since the early 1990s. The existing literature on these flows either 
focuses on individual economies or examines the determinants of FDI flows. Our contribution 
is to focus on private capital flows (excluding the more stable FDI flows), that is, flows which 
may complicate the conduct of macroeconomic policy; we test the sensitivity of our results to 
the exclusion of FDI flows. Furthermore, we use a panel of countries, allowing us to draw 
some broader conclusions about the nature of such flows rather than concentrating on the 
peculiarities of certain countries. 
In order to explain capital flows, we estimate two separate models. The first attempts 
to explain the level of capital flows; the second model focuses specifically on speculative 
crises by estimating the probability of a country experiencing downward speculative pressure 
on the exchange rate. In both cases, we distinguish between the impact of what we refer to as 
“domestic factors”, that is, macroeconomic aggregates that are largely under the control of the 
domestic authorities or at least are influenced directly by their policies and the effects of 
contagion, either through economic fundamentals or otherwise. If contagion from financial 
crises in other parts of the region/world is a feature, then this implies that in spite of 
successful domestic policies, the maintenance of the exchange rate peg could be complicated 
by developments in other countries which have spillover effects in the domestic economy. 
The results of both models suggest that, while domestic factors have a role to play in 
                                                           
1 The Finnish Markkaa and the Italian Lira joined/rejoined the ERM in October and November 1996 
respectively. Thus in June 1998, at the time when the decision to allow them to become euro area members was 
made, Finland and Italy had not completed the two-year period required to meet the Maastricht criteria. It could 
be argued, however, that, by the time that euro area membership would be effective, January 1999, the two-year 
requirement would have been met. 
  4  explaining capital flows and downward speculative pressure on the exchange rate, it is rather 
limited. Moreover, there is clear evidence of contagion effects. This suggests that 
macroeconomic policy in the prospective EU members will be complicated by capital flows in 
the run up to euro area membership. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide some stylised 
facts about capital flows in the countries under consideration here. Section 3 discusses how 
capital flows and speculative attacks are modelled and considers the existing literature. In 
section 4 we present our empirical results before offering some concluding remarks in section 
5. 
 
2. Capital Flows: some stylised facts 
The countries under consideration here include the transition economies which are 
already destined for EU membership in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and two transition economies, Bulgaria and 
Romania, whose EU membership is under consideration. We include Malta for completeness 
even through it is not a transition economy
2. Figures 1a-1c show private capital flows (both 
including and excluding FDI) as a proportion of GDP. They suggest that capital flows are of a 
significant magnitude so as to make their analysis interesting. Indeed, they are at least as great 
as those experienced by the peripheral southern European countries in the run up to their 
membership of the euro area (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2002). Such flows can complicate the 
conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies. Large inflows can undermine a tight 
monetary policy as a policy of sterilising the impact of the inflows on the domestic money 
supply becomes increasingly difficult or costly. Large outflows can put pressure on an 
exchange rate peg as reserves to defend the currency under attack can be rapidly depleted. 
The prospective EU members have a variety of exchange rate systems which have not 
necessarily remained unchanged over time. Table 1 provides a summary. Two points are 
worthy of note. First, exchange rate pegs have involved a number of currencies and not just 
                                                           
2 We consider the sensitivity of some of the results to the inclusion of Malta below. Cyprus, the other country 
joining in 2004, is excluded from the empirical analysis because of a lack of quarterly data. We do not examine 
the UK, Sweden and Denmark, the 3 EU members which are not also euro area members since we consider that 
the issues facing these countries are rather different – they have a history of macroeconomic stability and real 
per capita incomes are around the EU average. Their decision to remain outside the euro area is a political one 
which, in the case of the UK and Denmark is enshrined in an ‘opt out’ clause in the Maastricht Treaty. Such ‘opt 
outs’ are not available to acceding countries. 
  5  the euro
3. More recently, however, some countries have adopted the euro as their sole 
reference currency. Second, if any trend in the late 1990s can be detected, then it is a tendency 
for countries to move towards more flexible systems. With respect to controls on capital 
movements, these have been extensive in all countries with the exception of the Baltic states 
which removed almost all controls quite early on (Table 2). Liberalisation, which is a 
requirement of EU membership, has been proceeding in the other countries over the last 
couple of years. 
The vertical lines in figures 1a-1c represent changes in the exchange rate regime 
(either a move from a floating regime to some kind of peg or vice versa, something which can 
be gleaned from Table 1). Table 3 provides information on the average level of capital flows 
(both with and without FDI) and foreign exchange reserve changes and the correlation 
between them. Changes in reserves are at least as great as capital flows, possibly indicating 
problems for monetary policy. Changes in capital flows and reserves are usually positively 
correlated with the coefficients being even higher during periods of pegged exchange rate 
systems as we might expect. The low level of correlation in some cases may reflect the fact 
that the pegged arrangement was rather loose or simply that the flows were offset by 
countervailing movements in other parts of the balance of payments. There is no doubt from 
the figures, however, that at certain times movements in capital flows are closely reflected in 
movements in reserves. Indeed, Slovenia, the only country classified as floating for the whole 
period, has the highest correlation. Overall, the evidence suggests that inflows and outflows, 
including episodes of speculative crisis, have been important in the experience of these 
countries. 
 
3. Modelling capital flows and speculative crises 
An interesting question which arises in the light of the magnitude of these flows is 
whether we can explain them in terms of domestic factors and whether there is any role for 
the transmission of financial crises from one country to another. To this end, we initially 
focus on modelling the level of capital flows and we consider a number of possible 
determinants which have been employed in the literature. First, we might expect that domestic 
inflation or domestic monetary growth has a negative effect on capital inflows because it 
                                                           
3 Before January 1999, either the ECU exchange rate was targeted or the target involved certain of the currencies 
included in the ECU. 
  6  depresses the real rate of return in the domestic country or leads to expectations of 
devaluation because of its effect on competitiveness. Higher domestic inflation causes real 
exchange rate appreciation and hence a loss of competitiveness if the nominal exchange rate 
is fairly fixed (Hermes et al, 1999). An alternative measure of competitiveness is given by 
developments in unit labour costs. Both higher inflation and higher unit labour cost growth 
are expected to reduce capital inflows. 
Second, the nominal interest rate differential between the domestic and “foreign” 
countries is expected to have a positive impact on capital inflows (Durjasz and 
Kokoszczynski, 1998; Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Cardenas and Barrera, 1997). We also 
experiment with the change in the interest rate differential in line with a portfolio approach to 
capital flows which allows flows to cease even if interest rate differentials persist. Of course, 
differential rates of return are also determined by exchange rate movements. In the absence of 
information on expected changes in the exchange rate or forward premia/discounts, we use 
the actual change in the exchange rate. 
The third measure factor is economic activity. We use the rate of growth as a proxy for 
the health of the domestic economy and the investment opportunities which it is generating. 
The 1990s represented a period of rapid change in transition countries, often accompanied by 
greater uncertainty about future economic prospects. It might be expected that capital inflows 
responded positively to higher growth rates insofar as they reflected better economic 
conditions in general. 
  We include dummy variables to capture the possible effect of different exchange rate 
regimes on capital flows. Specifically, we identify those countries and periods with currency 
board arrangements as well as countries and periods with some form of pegged exchange rate 
relationship. The dummies are constructed based on the information in Table 1. Different 
exchange rate systems may impact on flows via their effect on credibility. Thus, for example, 
a pegged regime or a currency board may exert more monetary and fiscal discipline and hence 
be more credible in the eyes of the financial markets (Dickinson and Mullineux, 1999). In this 
case a positive coefficient on the regime dummies is expected. Alternatively, if the existence 
of a currency board or pegged regime makes a country more likely to be the target of an 
attack, then the expected sign of the coefficient on the dummy is negative. 
In addition to the factors determined largely by domestic policy considerations, there 
are the effects of contagion. Contagion may come about through economic fundamentals. A 
  7  crisis in one country which leads to a devaluation of its currency has obvious implications for 
the competitive position of its trading partners. Alternatively, contagion may arise because a 
crisis in one country generates self-fulfilling crises in other countries. In particular, we 
examine the impact of both the financial crisis in SE Asia, which erupted in July 1997 with 
the devaluation of the Thai baht and the failure of a number of financial institutions, and the 
Russian crisis of August 1998. We anticipate that both crises might well have led to capital 
outflows as global financial institutions withdrew en masse from emerging markets. We test 
both for a general effect of the crises across all countries and also for effects specific to 
individual countries in the sample. 
In the absence of adequate data on the stock of assets held abroad by residents of these 
countries or on the stock of assets held in these countries by nonresidents, we opt to model the 
short-run dynamics of capital flows
4. In particular, we postulate the following relationship: 
 
KFit = αi + βCBit +  γPERit + δ∆4Pit + ε∆4lnyit + η∆1rdiffit  + ζRussiat + κAsiat      (1) 
 
where KF is private capital inflows into country i at time t; CBit is a dummy capturing the 
existence of a currency board arrangement; PERit is a dummy indicating some form of pegged 
exchange rate regime (excluding a currency board arrangement); ∆4Pit is inflation (the four-
quarter change in the CPI); ∆4lnyit is the four-quarter rate of growth of real GDP (or industrial 
production); ∆1rdiffit is the quarter-to-quarter change in the interest rate differential between 
the domestic and “foreign” countries adjusted for changes in the exchange rate; Russiat is a 
dummy capturing the potential effects of the Russian crisis of August 1998 (it takes a value of 
1 during the third and/or fourth quarters of 1998); finally, Asiat is a dummy capturing the 
possible effects of the Asian financial crisis (it takes a value of 1 during the third and/or fourth 
quarters of 1997). As an alternative to inflation as a proxy of competitiveness, we use the 
four-quarter rate of growth of the money supply (both narrow and broad measures) and the 
four-quarter rate of growth of unit labour costs. 
                                                           
4 Most countries have no stock data and those that do have data only from the mid-1990s onwards. The approach 
to modelling capital flows is similar to that taken in Gibson and Tsakalotos (1993). The time series properties of 
these series were explored using ADF tests and the Phillips-Perron test. A priori, it is anticipated that the 
variables in equation (1) are I(0). In practice, however, this is not entirely true. Capital flows are I(0) for each 
country except Poland. This implies that it is unlikely that we will get spurious regression results owing to both 
dependent and independent variables being highly trended. 
  8  The data periods covered for our sample of countries are listed in Appendix 1. We 
estimate the model using quarterly data and an unbalanced panel of all the countries listed in 
Table 1. As we noted above, the existing literature on capital flows in prospective EU 
members either adopts a single country approach (Hermes et al, 1999; Durjasz and 
Kokoszczynski, 1998; Oblath, 1998; Gomulka, 1998) or examines FDI flows only (Dickinson 
and Mullineux, 1999; Lankes and Stern, 1999; Kinoshita and Campos, 2003). Our panel 
approach is an improvement over the single country approach and allows broader conclusions 
to be drawn about the nature of private flows. Our main focus is on non-FDI flows as this 
reflects our concern with the kind of flows that are more likely to complicate the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy. However, in view of measurement problems arising from the fact that 
it is difficult in practice to distinguish FDI flows from portfolio flows, we also consider 
capital flows including FDI in order to test the sensitivity of our results. 
Further evidence specifically on the impact of outflows can be gleaned from an 
analysis of the determinants of speculative crises in exchange rate regimes which involve 
some kind of nominal exchange rate fixity. Thus the second part of the empirical analysis 
focuses on estimating the probability of a speculative crisis. The literature on speculative 
crises identifies four main causes for crisis. First, it may arise from diverging fundamentals. 
Thus, for example, a country with a nominal exchange rate target and inflation which is 
higher than its trading partners will become increasingly uncompetitive leading to 
expectations of a realignment (Dornbusch, 1982; Flood and Garber, 1984). These models 
point to the dangers for the prospective EU members of trying to avoid convergence (unlikely 
if EMU membership is desired) or of trying to converge at a reasonably slow pace (more 
likely). Slower convergence can offer advantages in that it allows market expectations to 
adjust to the new regime and it is certainly the option which has been followed by most EU 
countries. The downside is that it introduces uncertainty into the minds of market participants 
and small deviations from the pre-announced convergence targets could trigger a speculative 
crisis. 
A second reason why outflows may become unmanageable is because of perceived 
policy differences (Eichengreen, 1993; De Grauwe, 1994; Ozkan and Sutherland, 1995). In 
the case of ERM II membership, the prospective EU members could become susceptible to 
perceived (real or otherwise) policy differences between themselves and the centre (the euro 
area), which market participants consider to be unsustainable. One of the lessons of the 1992-
  9  93 crises in the ERM was that if the exchange rate commitment implies that one country has 
to follow a policy which is unsuited to its economic conditions at that time, then this can call 
into question the credibility of exchange rate targets/central rates. Thus, if output is below 
trend and unemployment rising, then the costs of maintaining the peg may exceed the benefits 
and the authorities may decide to abandon it. Market participants realising this may put the 
peg under pressure, expecting a devaluation or abandonment of the peg. 
Thirdly, exchange rate pressure can come about as a result of self-fulfilling attacks 
caused by multiple equilibria (Obstfeld, 1996). In this case the fundamentals do not suggest 
that the economy is doing badly with the targeting policy. However, if an attack occurs, what 
would have been sustainable in the absence of an attack is now unsustainable due, for 
example, to a weak banking system. Finally, there is the issue of contagion as disturbances in 
international markets spread over into other countries. Self-fulfilling attacks may be triggered 
by contagion. It should not be forgotten that the 1992 crisis in the old ERM began with 
problems specific to Sweden which caused financial markets to question the sustainability of 
other central rates which had not previously been in doubt (Cobham, 1994). We cannot 
exclude the possibility that in the future disturbances in one country will spread to others in 
the system. Contagion can also lead to speculative attack via its effect on fundamentals. Thus 
depreciation or a fall in demand in one country may lead to speculative attacks as the 
expected loss of competitiveness or reduced demand for exports (due, for example, to a 
depreciation of the currency of a competitor economy) lead markets to question the 
sustainability of the peg. 
It is thus of interest to investigate not only the determinants of capital flows but also to 
focus explicitly on the determinants of the probability of a country experiencing a speculative 
attack. There are three common methodological approaches in the literature to modelling 
speculative attacks (see Gibson (2003) for a survey). The stylised facts approach simply 
examines the behaviour of certain macroeconomic variables around the speculative attack
5. 
Such an approach provides useful descriptive evidence on the nature of speculative attacks, 
but cannot examine the interaction between factors which may contribute to increasing the 
probability of a speculative attack. The second approach adopts multivariate analysis and uses 
                                                           
5 See, for example, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993; Buiter, Corsetti and 
Pesenti, 1998; Jeanne, 1997. 
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6. Finally, a time series approach uses interest rate 
differentials to estimate the probability of realignment for a country at each point in time and 
this estimated probability is then related to various macroeconomic variables which are 
hypothesised to affect the probability
7. 
Here we adopt a rather different approach. We estimate the probability of speculative 
attack using a hazard function, that is, we estimate the instantaneous probability of a 
speculative attack occurring at time t, conditional on there having been no speculative attack 
up to t. We describe this methodology in some detail in Appendix II. Here we can note that 
this approach has a number of advantages over the other approaches adopted in the literature. 
First, it allows us to utilise the time dimension of our dataset. A problem with purely cross-
sectional logic and probit models is that they require information on many countries, some of 
which have experienced a speculative attack and others which have not. Only with many 
countries will there be enough degrees of freedom to allow estimation of the model
8. 
Estimation of the hazard function implies that we can work with a smaller number of 
countries and include a time series for each country. In this way, countries can experience any 
number of speculative attacks. 
The second advantage of the hazard function approach is that it allows us to consider 
whether the probability of a speculative attack within an exchange rate regime depends, along 
with various macroeconomic factors and possible contagion effects, on the length of time that 
the country has been pursuing the policy of an exchange rate target. That is, we can 
investigate whether there are duration effects: controlling for all the other factors which might 
influence the probability of a speculative attack, the duration between speculative attacks 
might also play a role
9. Thus, if a country can gain a reputation within an exchange-rate 
targeting regime, then this in itself may well work to lower the probability of a speculative 
attack. In this case we anticipate a negative duration effect: the longer the country goes 
                                                           
6 See, for example, Edin and Vredin, 1993; Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995; 1996. 
7 Chen and Giovannini, 1997; Jeanne, 1997 and Ayuso and Perez-Jurado, 1997. 
8 Of course, one could estimate a panel logit or probit which includes both cross-section and time-series 
dimensions. However, such an estimate, while recognising that certain observations come from the same 
countries, does not take into account the fact that the observations for each country have a particular 
chronological order. We discuss these issues further in Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002). 
9 This is similar to duration effects in the unemployment literature. There the question is whether unemployment 
is characterised by hysteresis. If it is, then the probability of getting a job and moving out of the state of 
unemployment will depend not only on the individual’s characteristics, the macro economy, etc, but also on the 
duration of the spell of unemployment. The longer a person has been unemployed, the lower his/her probability 
of getting a job. See, for example, Meyer (1990). 
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now (all other things equal)
10. 
The dependent variable takes a value of 0 or 1 dependent on whether a speculative 
attack has occurred or not. We identify a speculative attack as being characterised by a large 
fall in foreign exchange reserves (more specifically, a fall greater than the mean change minus 
1.5 times the standard error of the change in reserves). This approach is similar to that 
adopted by Moreno (1995). 
The explanatory variables include those which have been identified in the literature to 
influence the probability of realignment or a speculative attack. Relative money supply 
growth rates (that is, the rate of growth of the money supply in the ‘out’ country relative to the 
‘foreign’ country
11), relative CPI inflation rates or unit labour cost growth are included to 
capture the idea that higher monetary expansion, inflation or unit labour cost growth will 
cause the exchange-rate targeting country to lose competitiveness and hence increase the 
probability of a speculative attack. The current account (as a percentage of GDP) might also 
capture this idea. That is, if exchange-rate targeting implies a continuous real appreciation of 
the domestic currency as it usually does when the exchange rate target is being used as a 
means of disinflation, then this is likely to be reflected in a growing current account deficit, 
bringing into question the sustainability of the targeting policy. The cyclical position of the 
economy (as represented by the rate of growth of GDP or industrial production) captures the 
political costs which might be associated with the exchange-rate targeting policy. Thus, if the 
policy is recessionary and growth falls or becomes negative, then the cost of continuing the 
peg increases (as unemployment rises), thus raising the probability of a speculative attack. 
Finally, we include three dummy variables. The first two capture the effects of the Asian and 
Russian crises and hence provide a measure of possible contagion effects (either of the self-
fulfilling kind or through the effects of crisis in one country on the fundamentals of another). 
The final dummy variable in the hazard identifies those countries with currency boards in an 
attempt to determine whether the institutional structure of a currency board affects the 
probability of a speculative attack. 
                                                           
10 Note that this reputation effect exists over and above improving fundamentals which are included in the 
equation. One can view it as the gains from establishing a reputation as a ‘hard-nosed’ government in resisting 
previous attacks. 
11 Where a basket of currencies is used as a peg, ‘foreign’ country variables are a weighted average of the 
various countries in the basket, the weights being those which each currency has in the peg. 
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The results of the equation for capital flows (equation 1) are presented in Table 4 
where capital flows are defined to exclude FDI. The Hausman test does not reject a random 
effects GLS regression over a fixed-effects (within) regression and thus we present the results 
from the random effects model
12. Model 1 in Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation 
(1)
13. The impact of domestic factors on capital flows is weak. Only inflation and growth are 
significant. This suggests that increases in inflation have a negative impact on capital inflows. 
The elasticity evaluated at the mean reveals that a 10% increase in inflation leads to a 1.4% 
decline in capital flows
14. Growth has a positive effect on capital inflows, although the 
elasticity (0.04 at the mean) is small. Interestingly, a currency board or pegged exchange rate 
system seem to attract capital inflows, perhaps because they are thought to eliminate 
exchange rate risk, increase credibility or lead to the belief that macroeconomic stability (and, 
in particular, low inflation) is a serious goal. The existence of either arrangement raises 
capital flows on average by over 2 percentage points of GDP. 
  Finally, the effects of contagion are clear with the dummy for the Russian crisis in 
1998 being strongly negative and significant
15. The size of the coefficient implies that the 
crisis led on average to a 6.8 percentage point fall, ceteris paribus, in capital flows/GDP in the 
third quarter of 1998. The dummies for the Asian crisis, by contrast, do not suggest the 
presence of contagion effects and are excluded from the final results. Model 2 investigates the 
contagion effect in more detail, by including a separate dummy for the Russian crisis for each 
country
16. In this way we investigate whether the effects of the crisis were felt differently in 
                                                           
12 A random effects model is reasonable when the individual country effects are viewed as randomly distributed 
across all the countries. This is appropriate if the countries are randomly drawn from a large population. On the 
other hand, where the model applies only to the countries in the study and not to those outside, then a fixed 
effects model is more appropriate. In our case, the capital flow model could apply to any country and hence we 
have a random sample of countries for that whole population. Thus the random effects model does not seem 
inappropriate. In any case the question is a statistical one. If the αi (the individual country effects) are correlated 
with the various explanatory variables, then a random effects model produces estimates which are biased and 
inconsistent. However, if there is no significant correlation then it is better to report the more efficient random 
effects model results. The Hausman test offers a test of this and is reported in Table 4.  
13 We also experimented with money growth, differential money growth and differential inflation. Additionally, 
we tried specifications with lags of the various explanatory variables. 
14 Unit labour cost growth, included either by itself or along with inflation, does not appear to have a significant 
role to play. It should be noted that the number of observations falls significantly (to 201 from 289) when we 
include unit labour cost growth because of incomplete data. 
15 The effect of contagion could be even greater than suggested by the dummy. If economic fundamentals 
deteriorate as a consequence of contagion, then this could lead to a further increase in the probability of a 
speculative attack. 
16 A similar test for the effect of the Asian crisis did not reveal much except for a negative impact on Latvia. 
  13  each country. The results indicate that the crisis had a negative impact on all countries, but 
Estonia and Hungary were amongst the worst hit. 
  In order to test the sensitivity of the results to our measure of capital flows, we rerun 
the regression with total private capital flows (including FDI) as our dependent variable. The 
results are quantitatively similar. Interestingly the dummies for the existence of a currency 
board or a pegged exchange rate arrangement have a larger positive effect when FDI flows are 
included, perhaps indicating that such arrangements signal a country’s commitment to 
macroeconomic stability. This is similar to Dickinson and Mullineux (1999) who find that 
macroeconomic uncertainty tends to reduce FDI flows to transition economies. The effect of 
the Russian crisis is smaller, reflecting the fact that contagion more strongly affects short-term 
capital flows. Finally, it is surprising that neither unit labour cost growth nor income growth 
as a proxy for the real opportunities in transition economies seem to affect capital flows 
(including FDI) significantly
17. 
The results of the hazard model are presented in Table 5. We report four models 
depending on whether we include growth and the specification of the underlying baseline 
hazard (see Appendix II). Models 1 and 3 include growth which reduces the sample size 
significantly mainly because it removes Malta from our sample (there are no quarterly GDP 
or industrial production figures). This has the advantage that we remain only with transition 
countries in models 2 and 4 and a comparison between the results for models 1 and 3 and 
those for models 2 and 4 show that the inclusion of Malta does not alter the qualitative 
conclusions we draw. 
Models 1 and 2 are a Weibull specification where the baseline hazard is assumed to be 
monotonically increasing or decreasing in duration. The results indicate that the underlying 
baseline hazard (the duration effects) is downward sloping in duration. That is, the longer a 
country goes without experiencing a speculative attack, the less likely it is to experience an 
attack. This may perhaps be interpreted as suggesting that reputation effects are indeed 
important. However, these results may be subject to unobserved heterogeneity bias which 
leads the underlying hazard to be estimated as downward sloping when in fact it is not. 
                                                           
17 FDI is influenced by the degree of transition (as measured by the various indices produced by the EBRD). The 
correlation coefficient between annual FDI flows and an average of EBRD transition indices is 0.43 over the 
period 1990-2001. Since these indices are produced annually and do not change much over time, their inclusion 
in our quarterly regressions is not very revealing. See also Kinoshita and Campos (2003) on the importance of 
good institutions for attracting FDI. 
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specification of the baseline hazard. This can help mitigate the negative duration bias (see 
discussion in Appendix II). Figure 2 shows that the non-parametrically specified baseline 
hazard (calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables) is slightly upward sloping, 
although it should be noted that it is not significantly so. This suggests that reputation effects 
are not important. Indeed, this is perhaps given some support by the fact that if a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of a currency board is included, it is not significant. If 
reputation were important and a currency board were seen as indicating that a country was 
tying its hands (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), then one might expect that its effect on the 
probability of speculative attack would be negative. 
The current account (as a percentage of GDP), growth and inflation differentials seem 
to have some role to play. The sign on the current account indicates that an increasing surplus 
reduces the probability of speculative attack. The magnitude of the coefficient is such that a 
one standard deviation rise in the current account deficit will increase the probability of a 
speculative attack by around 40%. Growth has a bigger effect with a one standard deviation 
increase in the growth rate reducing the probability of a speculative attack by around 50%. 
Differential inflation is significant at the 10% level in the models where growth is 
included. However, it does not have the expected sign – rather an increase in the inflation 
differential of the domestic country with the ‘foreign’ decreases the probability of a 
speculative crisis. This is in contrast to findings for ERM countries (Gibson, 2003) and 
perhaps results from the fact that in the early part of the period inflation was very high in most 
transition economies. The exchange rate peg quickly brought down inflation without 
generating a crisis. The crisis came later. This reading of the results is supported by two 
further pieces of evidence. Including Malta, a country which did not suffer from high 
inflation, causes the inflation differential to become insignificant (see models 2 and 4). 
Furthermore, if we run the models without very high inflation differentials, then the 
differential again becomes insignificant. The theoretical rationale for including inflation 
differentials stems from the fact that they provide some measure of competitiveness. An 
alternative proxy for competitiveness is unit labour cost growth. However, their inclusion 
does not help: either they are insignificant or have the wrong sign. The strong significance of 
the current account as a percentage of GDP in the models suggests that the impact of high 
inflation or excessive unit labour cost growth is only felt on the exchange rate peg once it 
  15  shows up in the current account. That is, the speculative attack comes with the deterioration in 
the current account; it is not anticipated by developments in inflation or unit labour costs 
Finally, we can note the strong effect from the Russian crisis, providing evidence that 
contagion is a significant factor in determining the probability of speculative attacks. This is 
shown in Table 5 by the strongly significant effect of the dummy variable which takes a value 
in the third quarter of 1998 when the bulk of the effect was felt. The effect of the crisis is also 
shown in Figure 2 where we plot the baseline hazards evaluated at the mean of the 
explanatory variables for the case where there is no Russian crisis (“without Russia”) and for 
the case with a Russian crisis (“with Russia”). It is clear that at the time of the Russian crisis a 
speculative attack was almost a certainty for those countries with some kind of exchange rate 
peg (the probability of realignment, as can be seen from Figure 2, is significantly higher) and 
this illustrates the vulnerability of these countries to economic events elsewhere in the region. 
By contrast, the dummies for the Asian crisis are not significant
18. 
In the above discussion, no distinction was made between successful and unsuccessful 
attacks. It is interesting to see whether successful attacks have different characteristics from 
attacks in general. To this end, we define a successful attack as one which either led to a 
devaluation or a widening of the currency band
19. The results are presented in Table 6 for the 
Weibull specification only
20. They suggest that the main conclusions drawn above remain – 
the current account surplus has a negative effect on the probability of a successful speculative 
attack and the Russian crisis a positive impact. 
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined the determinants of both capital flows and instances of 
speculative attacks in various transition economics who are also prospective EU and euro area 
members. The results suggest that while what we called domestic factors play a role, 
contagion is also important, especially from other countries in the area. Contagion may come 
                                                           
18 It is of course possible to estimate a hazard model for periods of upward speculative pressure, although since 
such inflows are more sustained in their nature, they are less amenable to a 0/1 categorisation. The results 
suggest that an increase in the current account surplus or a reduction in the inflation differential increase the 
probability of a country experiencing upward speculative pressure. This is in line with theoretical expectations. 
The other variables are not significant. 
19 One problem is that there are not many successful speculative attacks and hence the hazard cannot be 
estimated very precisely. 
20 There are too many durations for which there is no successful speculative attack to enable a meaningful semi-
parametric specification. 
  16  about because of economic linkages within a region. However, it might also reflect the fact 
that transition economies are classified as emerging markets. Recent experience suggests that 
problems in one emerging market can spread quickly to others not least because international 
financial institutions tend to have targets for the proportion of their portfolio invested in 
emerging markets as a group. Problems in one emerging market can lead to a reduction in this 
targeted proportion as the risks of the whole group are reassessed and hence to a withdrawal 
of funds from other emerging markets.  Additionally, funds can be withdrawn from other 
emerging markets as investors seek to cover their losses in one market by realising gains in 
another. 
These results shed some light on the likely experience of transition economies in the 
run up to euro area membership. Exchange rate targeting within ERM II may well prove to be 
tricky as capital flows undermine either attempts at reducing inflation (or maintaining low 
inflation) or the exchange rate target itself. Both will complicate the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy. Simply ensuring sound domestic policies may be a necessary 
condition for satisfaction of the criteria for EMU membership but may not be a sufficient one. 
This suggests that prospective members might have been better advised to proceed cautiously 
with further liberalisation of capital movements (Begg et al, 1999; 2003) or that a stronger 
commitment by the euro area to intervene in foreign exchange markets within the framework 
of ERM II is required. 
  17  Appendix I: Countries and data sources 
 
 
Country  data period  data sources 
     
Bulgaria 1991Q1-2001Q3 
Czechoslovakia 1990Q1-1992Q4 













Private capital flows: Financial Account, Foreign 
direct investment (abroad and in reporting 
country), other investments by monetary 
authorities (assets and liabilities) and other 
investments by general government (assets and 
liabilities) from IMF Balance of Payments 
Statistics. 
changes in reserve assets: Reserve Assets from 
IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. 
Interest rates, money supplies and consumer 
price inflation from IMF International Financial 
Statistics. 
Economic Activity: measured either by quarterly 
real GDP or industrial production taken from IMF 
International Financial Statistics. 
Unit labour costs are calculated using wages, 
industrial production and employment from IMF 
International Financial Statistics for Latvia and 
Lithuania and labour productivity in industry and 
wages and salaries in industry from the WIIW 
Monthly Database for Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
Note: Cyprus is not included since it does not 
publish quarterly balance of payments statistics. 
 




The standard proportional continuous time hazard function (Cox, 1972) is given by: 
 
g it = g0t exp[X it’β]          ( 1 )  
 
where git is the instantaneous probability of realignment for currency i conditional on survival 
to t. g0t is the underlying or baseline hazard at t which can be estimated if it is parametrically 
specified with respect to duration. It is common to use the Weibull specification which 
implies a monotonic hazard (that is, the probability of realignment increases or decreases log-
linearly with duration).  In this case, the existence of reputation effects would imply a hazard 
which decreases with duration (negative duration dependence). Xit is a vector of potentially 
time-varying explanatory variables and β is the vector of parameters. The hazard is 
proportional in that the explanatory variables cause a proportional scaling of the underlying 
hazard rather than affecting its shape (we can note that it has been shown that the 
proportionality assumption is not that restrictive (Bergstrom and Edin, 1992)). Equation (1) 
can be estimated by using a panel of  ‘out’ countries (that is, a cross-section of countries over 
time). 
Alternatively, we can use the discrete time analogue of Cox’s standard proportional 
continuous time hazard function (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978), hit, which is the probability 
that a realignment of currency i will occur between t and t+1 and is given by: 
 
 h  it = 1 - exp{-exp[X it’ β + Gt ] }         ( 2 )  
 
where Gt = ln[ ∫ t
t+1 g0(v)dv] 
 
The instantaneous underlying or baseline hazard is given by g0 and Gt yields the 
underlying hazard at each discrete duration t. Since we use quarterly data, each duration t is 
equivalent to a quarter in real time and a completed duration of t implies that a realignment 
occurred between quarter t and quarter t+1. It is worth noting that durations need not be of 
equal calendar time length. Gt gives us a measure of the duration effect and hence, if 
reputation effects are present, we anticipate that it has a negative slope. Estimation is by 
maximum likelihood and the underlying hazard can be estimated non-parametrically 
following Meyer (1990). 
The hazard approach has a number of econometric advantages. First, we can 
incorporate time-varying explanatory variables (the Xit) which implies there is no need to 
omit useful data as often occurs in static probit or logit analyses. Second, estimation of 
equation (2), the discrete time version, rather than equation (1), the continuous time version, 
implies that we can estimate the duration effect (reputation effect) non-parametrically using a 
flexible baseline hazard. This, in combination with the inclusion of time-varying covariates, 
has the advantage that it can help to reduce the bias that arises from unobserved heterogeneity 
(Lancaster (1979), Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Jenkins (1995)). Unobserved 
heterogeneity refers to factors which vary across countries and may well affect the probability 
of experiencing a speculative attack but which are unobservable or not easily measured and 
hence are not included in the model. It causes a negative duration dependence bias, that is, the 
  19  probability of a speculative attack occurring spuriously appears to decrease over time because 
the sample at longer durations becomes disproportionately dominated by countries with a 
lower probability of having a speculative attack. 
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Table 1 Exchange rate arrangements in prospective EU member countries 
 
Bulgaria  Had a floating exchange rate from 1990 until end-June 1997. From 1 July 1997, 
a currency board has been in operation with the currency pegged to the DM and, 
since 1999, the Euro. 
Czech Republic  From 1991 to 1993, as Czechoslovakia, the currency was pegged to a trade-
weighted composite of currencies (including the Austrian schilling, the French 
Franc, the DM, the Swiss Franc and the US dollar). From the beginning of 1993 
the basket was changed to two currencies, the DM and $. From end May 1997 
the exchange rate has been floating with intervention from the central bank to 
smooth the Koruna/euro rate. 
Estonia  Since mid-1992 a currency board has been in operation. Up until end-1998 it 
was a DM peg; since then it has become a euro peg. 
Hungary  Since the beginning of the 1990s, Hungary has followed a strategy of pegging its 
currency to a basket which from 1991 to 1999 consisted of the ECU (euro) and 
the US$. Periodic devaluations occurred along with a preannounced crawling 
depreciation. From 2000, the crawl was switched to the euro only; from October 
2001, the rate against the euro was fixed. 
Latvia  Initially the exchange rate was floating. Since February 1994, it has been pegged 
to the SDR. 
Lithuania  Initially the exchange rate was floating. Since April 1994, it has been pegged to 
the US$ via a currency board arrangement. 
Malta  Has pegged to a basket of currencies (including £, $ and the ECU/Euro) 
determined by their importance in Maltese trade. 
Poland  From 1990 until April 2000, the currency was pegged to a basket of currencies 
($, DM, £, French Franc and Swiss Franc until end-1998; euro and $ thereafter). 
Periodic devaluations occurred and crawling depreciations were announced. 
Since April 2000, the exchange rate has been floating. 
Romania  Pegged to a basket of 6 currencies dependent on trade during 1990. From 1991 
to July 1997 it was floating independently. Since August 1997, it has followed a 
managed float. 
Slovak Republic  From 1991 to 1993, as Czechoslovakia, the currency was pegged to a trade-
weighted composite of currencies (including the Austrian schilling, the French 
Franc, the DM, the Swiss Franc and the US dollar). From the beginning of 1993 
the peg to the basket of 5 currencies continued until July 1994 when a basket of 
two currencies (DM and $) was adopted. Since January 1999, the exchange rate 
has been managed with no preannounced path. 
Slovenia  Managed floating with no preannounced path since December 1992. 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various years. 
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Table 2: Controls on Capital Movements  
 
Bulgaria  Czech Republic Estonia  Hungary  Latvia Lithuania
Controls on payments for 
invisible transactions and current 
transfers 
yes            no no no no no
Repatriation requirements on 
proceeds from exports and 
invisible transactions 
yes            yes no yes no no
Surrender requirements on 
proceeds from exports and 
invisible transactions 
no no  no  no  no  no 
Capital transactions – controls 
on: 
          
- capital market securities  yes  yes (purchase of shares by 
nonresidents subject to direct 
investment regulation) 
no        yes no no
- money market instruments  yes  no  no  yes  no  no 
- collective investment 
securities 
yes            no no yes no no
- Derivatives and other 
instruments 
yes            no no yes no no
- commercial credits  no  no  no  no  no  no 
- financial credits  yes  no  no  yes  no  no 
- Guarantees, etc  yes  no  no  yes  no  no 
- Direct investment  no  yes  (in air transport only)  yes (in security sensitive 
areas) 
yes  yes (in gambling, 
lotteries) 
yes (in areas of defense, narcotics 
production and lotteries; additionally 
government can control purchase of 
privatised companies) 
- Liquidation of direct 
investment 
no            no no no no no
- Real estate transactions  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
- Personal capital movements  yes  no  yes (on real estate gifts)  yes  no  no 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Malta Poland  Romania  Slovak Republic  Slovenia
Controls on payments for 
invisible transactions and current 
transfers 
yes            yes yes yes no
Repatriation requirements on 
proceeds from exports and 
invisible transactions 
yes            yes yes yes no
Surrender requirements on 
proceeds from exports and 
invisible transactions 
yes            no no no no
Capital transactions – controls 
on: 
      
- capital market securities  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes   
- money market instruments  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes   
- collective investment 
securities 
yes            yes yes yes yes
- Derivatives and other 
instruments 
yes            yes yes yes yes
- commercial credits  no  yes  yes  yes  no   
- financial credits  yes  yes  yes  no  no   
- Guarantees, etc  yes  yes  yes  no  no   
- Direct investment  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes (in  sensitive areas)   
- Liquidation of direct 
investment 
yes            no no no no
- Real estate transactions  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes   
- Personal capital movements  yes  yes  yes  no  no   
        
Notes: 
Where the regulation relates only to a specific area (eg inward FDI into areas which might be sensitive for security reasons), further information is given. 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2001 
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Table 3: Private capital flows and changes in reserves (as a proportion of GDP) 
  Bulgaria  Czech 
Republic 
Estonia              Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
Private capital flows excluding FDI             
Average absolute private capital 
flows 
0.071                      0.057 0.070 0.058 0.059 0.042 0.144 0.034 0.033 0.074 0.045
-  during periods of pegged  
exchange rates 
0.030                      0.078 0.070 0.058 0.060 0.044 0.144 0.034 0.030 0.074 -
Average absolute change in reserves   0.078                      0.053 0.062 0.062 0.050 0.043 0.066 0.027 0.030 0.061 0.042
-  during periods of pegged 
exchange rates 
0.070                      0.074 0.062 0.062 0.036 0.036 0.066 0.027 0.037 0.063 -
Correlation between capital flows 
and changes in reserves 
0.154                      0.630 0.278 0.287 -0.203 -0.352 -0.074 0.123 0.231 0.459 0.812
-  during periods of pegged 
exchange rates 
0.373                      0.667 0.278 0.287 0.105 -0.194 -0.074 0.123 0.636 0.472 -
Private capital flows including FDI             
Average absolute private capital 
flows 
0.085                      0.079 0.099 0.081 0.089 0.067 0.080 0.036 0.041 0.081 0.049
-  during periods of pegged 
exchange rates 
0.064                      0.099 0.099 0.081 0.097 0.073 0.080 0.036 0.042 0.079 -
Correlation between capital flows 
and changes in reserves 
0.239                      0.788 0.321 0.672 -0.288 -0.164 0.422 0.116 0.145 0.459 0.841
-  during periods of pegged 
exchange rates 
0.342                      0.754 0.321 0.672 0.159 0.078 0.422 0.116 0.317 0.468 -
Source: own calculations from data from IMF International Financial Statistics 
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Table 4: The determinants of capital flows 
 
dependent variable: private capital flows (excluding FDI, government and monetary authority 
flows) as a proportion of GDP 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coefficient standard  error coefficient standard  error 
Constant  0.015* 0.007 0.015* 0.007 
rate of growth  0.067+ 0.039 0.072+ 0.039 
Inflation  -0.009* 0.004 -0.009* 0.004 
currency board  0.024** 0.008 0.024** 0.010 
pegged exchange rate regime  0.023** 0.010 0.024** 0.008 
Russia  -0.068** 0.022     
Russian effect on:      
- Czech Republic     -0.035  0.062 
- Estonia     -0.192**  0.062 
- Hungary     -0.148*  0.062 
- Latvia     -0.003  0.062 
- Lithuania     -0.028  0.062 
- Romania     -0.014  0.062 
- Slovak Republic     -0.047  0.062 
- Slovenia     -0.079  0.062 
      
number of observations  289 289 
Overall significance of 
model 
Chi
2(5)=36.80 (prob=0.00)  Chi
2(12)=45.37 (prob=0.00) 
R
2  0.1152 0.1414 
    
Notes: + significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
A Hausman test cannot reject a random effects model over a fixed effects model (Chi
2(5) = 7.33, 
prob=0.00). Hence the results above are for random effects models which are more efficient. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the probability of a speculative attack 
  Model 1 – Weibull hazard 
model 
Model 2 – Weibull hazard 
model 
Model 3 – Semi-parametric 
hazard model 




Coefficient  standard 
error 
coefficient  standard 
error 
Coefficient  standard 
error 
Inflation (lagged one quarter)  -2.469+  1.459              -0.751 0.890 -3.102+ 1.647 -0.934 0.962
Current account (%GDP, lagged 
one quarter) 
-8.861*                3.467 -7.244** 2.396 -11.592* 4.579 -8.246** 2.663
Growth (lagged one quarter)  -5.227*  2.191      -6.899**  2.546     
Russian  crisis                  1.969** 0.586 1.719** 0.503 2.688** 0.950 2.173** 0.646
Constant                  -2.442** 0.529 -2.402 0.412 -2.609** 0.737 -2.728** 0.591
Baseline hazard  Log(t)  Log(t)  Non-parametric    Non-parametric
-0.800** 0.230 -0.952** 0.177  Chi
2(12)=10.87 (prob=0.54)  Chi
2(15)=9.18 (prob=0.87) 
Country-specific effects  Chi
2(8)=4.08 (prob=0.85)  Chi
2(10)=8.24 (prob=0.60)  Chi
2(8)=5.25 (prob=0.73)  Chi
2(10)=8.16 (prob=0.61) 
LogL          -69.77 -108.63 -59.01 -96.05
Specification test  -0.72 (prob=0.473)  -1.15 (prob=0.25)      1.55  (prob=0.12) -0.24  (prob=0.81)
Model Chi
2  Chi
2(5)=23.63 (prob=0.00)  Chi
2(4)=21.17 (prob=0.00)  Chi
2(16)=34.1 (prob=0.01)  Chi
2(18)=31.98 (prob=0.02) 
number of countries  10  11  10  11 
number  of  observations          204 297 179 261
Notes: + significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
The countries included are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia (until end-1992), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic. They are included for the periods when they had some kind of exchange rate peg. Slovenia did not have a peg over the period 1990-2000 and hence is 
excluded. 
The specification test is due to Pregibon (1980). Similar to a standard RESET test, it is distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no 
misspecification. 
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Table 6: Determinants of a successful speculative attack 
  Model 1   Model 2  
coefficient standard 
error 
Coefficient  standard 
error 
Inflation (lagged one quarter)          -0.808 2.521 -0.604 1.797
Current account (%GDP, lagged 
one quarter) 
-14.836+        8.253 -13.686* 6.183
Growth (lagged one quarter)  0.910  5.416     
Russian crisis  1.960+  1.128  2.169*  1.131 
Constant       -2.992** 1.386  -2.930** 1.118
Baseline hazard  Log(t)  Log(t) 
-1.689** 0.436 -1.824** 0.430
Country-specific effects  Chi
2(4)=4.81 (prob=0.31)  Chi
2(3)=3.42 (prob=0.33) 
LogL      -23.65 -25.43
Specification test  -0.38 (prob=0.702)  -0.70 (prob=0.49) 
Model Chi
2  Chi
2(5)=6.84 (prob=0.23)  Chi
2(4)=7.83 (prob=0.10) 
number of countries  10  11 
number of observations  204  297 
Notes: see Table 5 
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Figure 1a: Eastern European countries - capital flows and reserves
Bulgaria
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Figure 1b: Eastern European countries - capital flows and reserves
Latvia
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Figure 1c: Eastern European countries - capital flows and reserves
Romania
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Figure 2: Baseline Hazards
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